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II 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant stands on his opening brief for the merits of the issue, but replies here 
to urge this Court to reject the state's request "that this Court modify the "reasonable 
time" standard for filing successive petitions in non-capital cases and adopt the 42-day 
standard established by the Idaho Supreme Court for filing successive petitions in 
capital cases from Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 727, 202 P.3d 642 (2008)." 
Respondent's brief at p. 11. 
To begin with, the state raises this issue for the first time on appeal. While the 
state generally argued below that the successive petition was untimely, it certainly did 
not argue that it needed to be brought within 42 days or that the reasonable time 
standard be modified and the capital case standard be adopted in non-capital cases. 
Nor did the district court sua sponte make this suggestion or rule in this way. 
Second, the state's suggestion that the capital case standard apply to non-capital 
cases ignores the principle that "death is different" and so there is a very different 
statutory scheme concerning capital appeals and post conviction relief. In fact, the title 
of the relevant statute itself declares that special procedures are to be used in capital 
cases and the introductory sentence explains that their purpose is to expedite the 
process: 
§ 19-2719. Special appellate and post-conviction procedure for capital 
cases -- Automatic stay 
The following special procedures shall be interpreted to accomplish the 
purpose of eliminating unnecessary delay in carrying out a valid death 
sentence. 
I.C. § 19-2719 
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Other provisions of the capital statute require that all legal challenges (known or 
that should have been known), including by post conviction relief procedures, be 
brought within 42 days of judgment. I.C. § 19-2719(3)&(4). Additionally, the appeal from 
any post conviction order must be part of the appeal from the conviction and sentence 
and all issues shall be considered in the same appellate proceeding. I.C. § 19-2719(6). 
By contrast, there are no comparable provisions which apply to non-capital 
cases. Instead of the post conviction proceedings occurring immediately after the 
judgment is filed and then its appeal being prosecuted along with the direct appeal, the 
normal procedure in a non-capital case is for a direct appeal to be prosecuted, followed 
by a petition for post conviction relief, which would then be the subject of its own appeal. 
Rather than a time limit of 42 days from the entry of judgment, the post conviction 
petition can be filed up to one year from the conclusion of the direct appeal. I.C. § 19-
4902. 
Given the significant differences in procedure between capital and non-capital 
cases, the fact that capital cases have a 42 day standard for the bringing of a 
successive petition has no logical or legal bearing on what is a reasonable time in which 
to bring a successive petition in a non-capital case. Further, the policy reason behind 
the 42 day period in capital cases is to avoid unnecessary delay in carrying out of the 
death sentence. There is obviously no parallel policy reason for non-capital cases since 
those sentences have already been executed and thus post conviction procedures do 
not delay the sentences from being carried out. 
Next, underlying the 42 day standard for the bringing of successive petitions in 
capital cases is the reality that an inmate facing a death sentence almost certainly will 
2 
have counsel (or fairly easy access to counsel) at the time the successive petition 
needs to be filed. After the state court proceedings, the capital petitioner will be 
represented in the federal habeas proceedings and the appeals which will inevitably 
follow. Even if no proceedings are currently pending, the capital petitioner will either 
continue to be represented or be able to obtain counsel in short order. 
This is all in contrast to the non-capital petitioner. While the non-capital petitioner 
may well have had counsel during the direct appeal and initial post conviction petition 
proceedings, the ordinary non-capital petitioner learning of new information on which a 
successive petition could be based would probably be unrepresented and have no easy 
access to an attorney. 1 The non-capital petitioner would also probably have limited 
access to a telephone, legal materials, and investigative resources. 
Accordingly, unlike the capital defendant who is almost certainly represented 
and so has a chance of meeting a 42 day deadline, it strains credulity to suggest that it 
is reasonable for a pro se non-capital defendant to be expected to analyze the new 
information both factually and legally, understand that a successive petition needs to be 
brought, and then prepare the petition and file it, all within 42 days. 
Appellant asserts that 42 days will prove to be an inadequate time for non-capital 
petitioners to file successive petitions. Just as the state anticipates challenges to the 
case by case time standard, Appellant anticipates challenges to a 42 day standard in 
1 As an aside, the state points out that undersigned counsel (new counsel) was 
appointed by the State Appellate Public Defender to represent Mr. Hoffman in the direct 
appeal of his resentencing and seems to suggest that undersigned counsel could have 
brought the instant petition on behalf of Mr. Hoffman. This is not correct, because the 
State Appellate Public Defender only has statutory authority to represent capital 
defendants in district court post conviction relief proceedings, otherwise, in non-capital 
cases representation is only provided for appeals from post conviction relief 
proceedings. I.C. § 19-870(1)(d). 
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non-capital cases, particularly given that Idaho's 42 day deadline (the shortest in the 
nation) for bringing an initial petition in a capital case has been found to be inadequate 
in two Ninth Circuit cases, one involving the instant defendant. Hoffman v. Arave, 236 
F.3d 523 (9th Cir. 2001); Sivak v. Hardison, 658 F.3d 898 (9th Cir 2011). While the 
problem in those cases, to wit, that post conviction counsel was the same as trial 
conviction, has been statutorily remediated (at least for capital cases), these cases 
nevertheless illustrate that unnecessarily imposing what was called a "uniquely harsh" 
deadline on non-capital petitioners is fraught with problems that can be easily avoided. 
To that end, in the event that this Court agrees with the state that a bright line 
standard should be adopted in non-capital cases in order to give petitioners clear 
guidance as to when their successive petitions are due, Appellant suggests that said 
period be one year and not 42 days. The 42 day standard for a successive petition in a 
capital case is obviously based on the 42 day deadline for bringing an initial petition in a 
capital case. Since the statute of limitations for a non-captial initial petition is one year, 
it makes perfect sense that the standard for a non-capital successive petition would also 
be one year. In short, pegging the non-capital successive petition standard to the non-
capital initial petition standard, rather than the capital petition standard, is more logical, 
consistent, and fair. 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, for the reasons as stated above and in Appellant's opening brief, 
Appellant/Petitioner respectfully requests that the district court's summary denial of the 
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post conviction petition be reversed and that this matter be remanded for an evidentiary 
hearing. . k 
DATED this d-.<; 0day of January, 2013. 
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